A curated set of works on biosafety, biosecurity, compliance, and research governance. Links open external publications.
The common thread across these pieces is implementation, what holds up in real organizations, what fails quietly, and what makes oversight workable for the people responsible for safety and accountability.
A global snapshot of what biosafety professionals report as the biggest challenges, near-term priorities, and the kinds of support that would help most. Explore the interactive dashboard or download the PDF summary.
A practical set of considerations for NIH’s modernization effort, focused on what makes oversight implementable: risk frameworks that match today’s research, clearer decision support for Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBCs), and learning systems that improve consistency without turning oversight into paperwork.
An examination of proposals to centralize high-risk pathogen research and why concentrating work in fewer locations may undermine resilience, workforce development, and practical biosafety capacity.
A look at what biosafety practitioners actually experience in their roles, and what that means for training, organizational support, and better governance.
Examines how biosecurity must evolve alongside a rapidly expanding bioeconomy, emphasizing implementation, incentives, and governance that works in real institutions.
A practical look at how real-world implementation can make or break oversight, and what helps programs work without turning into paper compliance.
A fast-moving moment for U.S. life sciences oversight, and what “workable governance” looks like when it has to function in real institutions.
A clear framing of how oversight has evolved, plus a practical approach to governance that supports innovation while strengthening safety and security.
A candid reflection on managing dual-use research challenges, including the practical realities of communication, teamwork, transparency, and scrutiny.
A case for fixing fragmented oversight through clearer accountability, coordination, and a structure designed for implementation.
A critique of the Risky Research Review Act, focused on how broad definitions and duplicated processes can create burden without improving outcomes.
Proposes a national agency model to unify oversight, streamline requirements, and strengthen safety, security, and compliance.
Survey evidence from U.S. institutions on how DURC and enhanced potential pandemic pathogen (ePPP) policies are implemented in practice, including how staffing, resources, and reporting mechanisms relate to higher-risk research and effective oversight.
Seven concrete opportunities to improve governance and reporting in ways that strengthen oversight and still work for real organizations.
A clear argument that broad, unclear review rules can slow research and create confusion without meaningfully improving safety.
A look at updated U.S. oversight rules for certain categories of pathogen research and what the changes could mean for implementation.
A short, high-impact piece on what makes biosecurity policies actually work in practice, not just on paper.
A human, readable look at how biosafety professionals learn the work, and why that practical knowledge matters for better training and better rules.
Argues that biosafety should be treated as an evidence-based science of risk assessment and mitigation (not just compliance), proposing an updated definition and calling for investment in training, research capacity, and institutional support.
A practical case for modernizing biosafety so it keeps pace with a changing bioeconomy, with emphasis on real incentives and real implementation.
A plain-language explainer of what “gain of function” means, why some researchers use it, and how safety, security, and oversight frameworks shape debates about risks, benefits, and alternatives.
Reflects on how institutions adapted biosafety programs, facilities, and processes to rapidly support SARS-CoV-2 research, highlighting practical risk-mitigation approaches and lessons for future public health emergencies.
Argues that rethinking and testing assumptions about the relationship between biological research, security, and society through experimentation can improve biosecurity governance.
Argues that professionalization, through formal credentials, standards, and career pathways, could strengthen biosecurity policy and improve day-to-day practice.